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Abstract
We propose a data-constrained generalized maximum entropy (GME) estimator for dis-
crete sequential move games of perfect information which can be easily implemented on
optimization software with high-level interfaces such as GAMS. Unlike most other work on
the estimation of complete information games, the method we proposed is data constrained
and does not require simulation and normal distribution of random preference shocks. We
formulate the GME estimation as a (convex) mixed-integer nonlinear optimization problem
(MINLP) which is well developed over the last few years. The model is identied with only
weak scale and location normalizations, monte carlo evidence demonstrates that the esti-
mator can perform well in moderately size samples. As an application, we study the social
security acceptance decisions in dual career households.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Nash equilibrium is one of the cornerstones of modern economic theory, with substantive
application in all major elds in economics, particularly industrial organization. It is the
benchmark theoretical model for analyzing strategic interactions among a handful of players.
Given the importance of gaming in economic theory, the empirical analysis of games has been
the focus of a recent literature in econometrics and industrial organization, such as Golan,
Karp and Perlo¤ (1998, 2000) (hereafter GKP), Haile, Hortacsu and Kosenok (2003), Tamer
(2003), Seim (2005), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), Aradillas-Lopez (2007, 2008), Bajari,
Hong, John Krainer and Nekipelov (2009) and Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2009) (hereafter
BHR).
Econometrically, a discrete game is a generalization of a standard discrete choice model,
such as the conditional logit or multinomial probit. An agents utility is often assumed to
be a linear function of covariates and a random preference shock. However, unlike a dis-
crete choice model, utility is also allowed to depend on the actions of other agents. Such
modeling strategy was rst suggested by the seminal work of Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,
1991). Although there are numerous studies on both methodology and empirical applica-
tions of game-theoretic models, the most widely studies is the class of incomplete information
simultaneous-move games (normal form) and dynamic games, see Bajari, Hong, Krainer and
Nekipelov (2009) and Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007). The complete information games
received fewer studies due to its computational complexity, since it involves multidimen-
sional integrals. More recently, BHR (2009) provides simulation-based estimators (more-
over, Method of Simulated Moments (MSM)) for static complete information discrete games
based on importance sampling. Furthermore, estimation of sequential-move (extensive form)
games has been quite limited, especially on itsgeneral form, Berry (1992), Mazzeo (2002)
and Schmidt-Dengler (2006) estimate some simplied sequential-move games with special
game structure. The estimation of the general class of sequential games has su¤ered from
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its computational complications, for sequential-move games, to the best of our knowledge,
Maruyama (2009) was the only existing literature, which provides a simulation-based es-
timator for the general class of discrete-choice perfect information sequential game with a
modied version of the GHK simulator (Geweke (1989, 1991), Hajivassiliou and McFadden
(1998) and Keane (1990, 1994)), which he called as "sequential GHK". The estimator pro-
vided by Maruyama (2009) essentially is a maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) estimator,
As is well known, MSL is biased for any xed number of simulations, in order to obtain
p
T consistent estimators, one needs to increase the number of draws S so that Sp
T
! 1.
Such estimator requires larger scale simulation and also relies on the normal distribution of
random preference shocks. Thus, computational burden also exists and makes its application
adjective.
In this paper, we propose a data-constrained generalized maximum entropy (GME) esti-
mator for discrete sequential-move games of perfect information which can be easily imple-
mented since it does not require simulation, moreover, it also does not rely on the normality
of random preference shocks. In the spirit of GKP (1998, 2000), the rst application of GME
to the estimation of game-theoretic models, and Su and Judd (2008), which argues that the
direct optimization approach, called the MPEC (Mathematical Programming with Equilib-
rium Constraints) to structural estimation that avoids repetitive solution of the structural
model is more powerful than traditional procedures such as the Nest Fixed-Point (NFXP)
algorithm (Rust, 1987), we formulate the GME estimation as a mixed-integer nonlinear op-
timization (MINLP) problem which also be a direct optimization problem. Moreover, when
the deterministic part of the payo¤ function is linear, it will be a convex MINLP, such opti-
mization problems are well developed over the last few years (Grossmann (2002), Nowak and
Vigerske (2008), Bonami, Kilinc and Linderoth (2009)) and there are several state-of-the-art
solvers incorporated into many software packages (such as Tomlab which you can call from
Matlab) and optimization modeling language, such as GAMS and AMPL1, the user need
1Although such modeling languages (softwares) are commercial, you can use a free internet service, NEOS
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not make decision about the algorithmic details thus our estimator is easy to use.
Econometrically, the main concern of such estimation problems is to formulate the critical
function, possible choices are likelihood function or some distance function such as method
of moments. Unfortunately, with a general structural model, such functions involve the
multidimensional integrals, most studies alleviate this problem by simplifying the model
structure or make use of some simulation-assisted estimation method, such as MSM and
MSL, even with the simulaiton-based method which known to obtain many prefer large
sample properties, they always need large draws and then computational burden incurred.
Furthermore, such simulation methods always not easy to use which also limit its application.
Instead of using simulation to deal with the multidimensional integrals, we overcome this
problem by using the data-constrained equilibrium conditions which treat all the random
shocks not observed by econometricians as endogenous parameters, thus the parametric
distribution assumption wiped o¤. With these data-constrained equilibrium conditions, the
nature choice of the critical function is the entropy (Shannon, 1948) and then formulate a
GME problem. The GME principle was introduced by Golan et al. (1996), which is based
on the classic maximum entropy (ME) approach of Jaynes (1957a, 1957b, 1984), which
uses the entropy-information measure of Shannon (1948) to recover the unknown probability
distribution of underdetermined problems, and started a new discussion in econometrics
(among others, Golan, Judge and Perlo¤ (1997), Mittelhammer and Cardell (1997), Golan,
Perlo¤, and Shen (2000), Golan (2003), and Nunez, G. (2009)). The GME estimators are
obtained by a constrained optimization problem which maximized the entropy objective
function constrained by the model properties (such as equilibrium conditions), due to the
structure of the perfect information sequential move game, the equilibrium (which known
as sub-game perfect equilibria) conditions contain logical connections between endogenous
variables, as a result, the common constrained optimization problem comes to be a mixed-
Server (http://neos.mcs.anl.gov/neos/), which gives the user acess to several state-of-the-art solvers such
as the MINLP solvers, BARON and BONMIN.
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integer nonlinear optimization problem, since we can always modify logical statements with
integer variable, moreover, zero or one variables (H.P. Williams, 1985). With the e¢ cient
algorithms such as Branch and Bound (BB), Outer-Approximation (OA) and Hybrid OA
based Branch-and-Cut (B-Hyb), we can solve this GME problem accurately, as shown below,
with a linear payo¤ function, our GME problem is a convex MINLP, which can be exactly
solved by most of the existing algorithms (Bonami, Kilinc and Linderoth (2009)).
Our approach makes several contributions to the literature on estimating game theoretic
models, especially the complete (perfect) information case. First, our approach avoids the
usual multidimensional integrals by using the data constraints instead of the moment con-
straints in complete (perfect) information case, the computational burden is acceptable for
most applications. Although we focus on the sequential-move game, our approach can be
extend to static game of complete information. GKP (1998, 2000) also make use of the GME
to estimate the static game, their constraints are moment based since they deal with the
incomplete information case. Second, there is no need for the normality of random pref-
erence shocks in our approach, this assumption is prerequisite for the existing estimators
for general complete information games, such as BHR (2009) for static case and Maruyama
(2009) for sequential-move case. Although BHR (2009) only make the assumption that such
distribution should be known to any parametric distribution, mostly the choice only can
be normal since weve no prior information about that. And for Maruyama (2009), since
GHK simulator can only work under normal distribution, it highly relies on the normal as-
sumption. Third, we reformulate the estimation problem as a MINLP since there are logical
connections between endogenous variables among the equilibrium conditions, to the best of
our knowledge, our estimator is the rst one which makes use of MINLP in econometric
estimation problems2, since our monte carlo shows the validity of this estimation procedure,
this reformulation can be extended to other estimation problems where logical statements
2Jouneau-Siona and Torrès (2006) formulate Maximized Monte Carlo (MMC) test as a Mixed Integer
Programming problem.
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incurred. The most shortcoming of our approach is that it is very hard to construct the large
sample properties if not impossible, then the exactly tests and inference procedures can not
be provided. As argued by Su and Judd (2008), to use such MPEC style results to compute
standard errors, we need to work through the implicit construction of the critical function
to formulate the exactly Hessian of the critical function with respect to the structural pa-
rameters, such work seems hard within the MINLP framework. Mittelhammer and Cardell
(1997) provide the large sample distributions for GME estimator of general linear models,
also, they prove the consistency and asymptotic normality. Since our monte carlo simula-
tions show the consistency and asymptotic normality of the proposed estimator, following
the arguments of Horowitz (1995, 1998, 2001), Campbell and CarterHill (2001) and Su and
Judd (2008), we use the paired bootstrap methods to construct standard errors and related
inference, although the bootstrap may not provide the asymptotic renements since our es-
timator essentially is obtained from a nonsmooth optimization. Campbell and CarterHill
(2001) also shows how to reformulate linear inequality restrictions in GME framework.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the general discrete sequential-
move game to be estimated and formulate its equilibrium conditions. For purposes of exposi-
tion, a simple 222 sequential entry game also be provided, which will be used extremely
in the following sections. A briey reviews of the maximum entropy, generalized maximum
entropy estimation and the (convex) mixed-integer nonlinear programming are presented in
section 3. Although there is no exactly identication problem in GME framework (Golan et
al., 1996), we discuss the identication issue from the nature of the game structure and equi-
librium conditions in section 4, our GME estimation for the discrete sequential-move game
of perfect information is also presented. Monte carlo simulations are conducted in section
5. Section 6 contains the empirical application to the social security acceptance decisions in
dual career households. Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 THE MODEL
In the model, there are T independent repetitions of a sequential move game of perfect
information (extensive form game). In each game there are i = 1; :::; Nt players, each with
the nite set of actions Ait. Dene At = iAit and let at = (a1t; :::; ait; :::aNt) denote a generic
element of At. Without loss of generality, the order of subscripts for players (1; :::; Nt) also
represents the decision order of the sequential move game in each repetition, that means
player 1 makes decision rst and player Nt at the end. Player is von Neumann-Morgenstern
(vNM) utility is a map uit : At ! R, where R is the real line. Since we study the perfect
information case, the corresponding equilibrium concept is the subgame perfect equilibria
(SPE), this can be achieved when every player expects no gain from individually deviating
from its equilibrium strategy in its every subgame, the standard technique for solving the SPE
is backward induction, furthermore, the nite sequential move game of perfect information
where there is no player is indi¤erence between any two outcomes has a unique SPE. We
will sometimes drop the subscript t for simplicity when no ambiguity would arise.
Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), assume that the vNM utility of player i can
be written as:
ui(a; x; i; ) = fi(x; a; ) + i(a) (1)
In Equation (1), player is vNM utility from action a is the sum of two terms. The rst
term fi(x; a; ) is a function which depends on a, the vector of actions taken by all of the
players, covariates x, the playerscharacteristics and some other variables which inuence
the utility, and parameters , covariates x are observed to the econometrician. The second
term is i(a), a random preference shock which reects the information about utility that is
common knowledge to the players but not observed by the econometrician. Unlike Maruyama
(2009), here the preference shocks depend on the entire vector of actions a, not just the
actions taken by player i. As argued by BHR (2009), this is a more general setting and
seems straightforward within the game framework, think about a simple entry game, the
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unobserved information of one player to econometrician may be di¤erent not only among
players but also action vector dependent. i(a) are assumed to be independent or some
known dependence, let i denote the vector of the individual i(a) and i denote the vector
of all the shocks. we will discuss more about the structure of i in the identication and
estimation section.
As noted above, the equilibrium concept corresponding to the sequential move game of
perfect information, SPE, is a equilibrium strategy prole which means that every player
expects no gain from individually deviating from its equilibrium in every subgame. A strategy
of player i 2 N is a function that assigns an action in Ai to each nonterminal history,
a players deviation form equilibrium holding others decisions xed does not mean that
all the others make the same decision, it means the others follow the same strategy. But
what can be observed is only the equilibrium actions (i.e. equilibrium outcome). Thus, for
deriving the equilibrium conditions in our econometric model, we should make the others
action prole when one player deviating as endogenous variable. Formally, an SPE action
prole, aSPE = (aSPE1 ; :::a
SPE
i ; :::a
SPE
N ), is any solution for the decisions of the players that
satises:
ui(a
SPE
i ; a
SPE
 i ; x; i; )  ui(ai; aSPE<i ; a>i(aSPE<i ; ai); x; i; )  0 (2)
for all i = 1; :::; N and all ai 6= aSPEi .
where a>i(a
SPE
<i ; ai) is the unique SPE action prole for the subgame that starts from player
i+1 given the decisions of the preceding players, ai. This equilibrium conditions are dened
recursively and the solution can be easily calculated by the backward induction for any given
parameters , observed covariates, x, and unobservable shocks .
Given such structure of the discrete choice sequential move game, our task is to estimate
and draw an inference about the parameters of payo¤ functions, , with the observation
of action prole ao, some covariates which have e¤ect on the payo¤s, x, and an exogenous
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decision order. Note that the actual payo¤ levels are unobserved, since in most case, we can
not determine what they should be, i.e. they are the latent variables.
For purposes of exposition, here we provide a simple 222 sequential entry game as an
example, which will be used extremely in our analysis. There are two players who act as the
potential entrants in each of the T markets, the structure of this entry game is illustrated in
Fig.1 with payo¤s u1 and u2. The decision rule or the equilibrium conditions corresponding
to (2) can be easily formulated, as an example, for action prole (0; 0) to be
Fig.1 A Simple Entry Game
P1
P2 P2
0 1
0 1 0 1
f1(x; 0; 0; ) + 1(0; 0) f1(x; 0; 1; ) + 1(0; 1) f1(x; 1; 0; ) + 1(1; 0) f1(x; 1; 1; ) + 1(1; 1)
f2(x; 0; 0; ) + 2(0; 0) f2(x; 0; 0; ) + 2(0; 1) f2(x; 1; 0; ) + 2(1; 0) f2(x; 1; 1; ) + 2(1; 1)
an equilibria, equilibrium condition
u1(x; 0; 0; 1(0; 0); ) > u1(x; 1; 0; 1(1; 0); ) if u2(x; 1; 0; 2(1; 0); ) > u2(x; 1; 1; 2(1; 1); )
u1(x; 0; 0; 1(0; 0); ) > u1(x; 1; 1; 1(1; 1); ) if u2(x; 1; 0; 2(1; 0); )  u2(x; 1; 1; 2(1; 1); )
u2(x; 0; 0; 2(0; 0); )  u2(x; 0; 1; 2(0; 1); )
(3)
should be satised, the equilibrium conditions for other three action proles to be equilib-
rium actions can be formulated similarly. As noted above, since we only can observe the
equilibrium actions but not the strategies, the equilibrium conditions contain the logical
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statements due to the o¤ equilibrium paths choice, since the o¤ equilibrium paths choices
are unobserved to econometricians. We make use of MINLP to handle such logical state-
ments.
3 PRELIMINARY
Since we use data-constrained GME approach to estimate the perfect information sequential
move game in order to avoid the multidimensional integrals. We start by providing some
background of how the generalized maximum entropy approach works, furthermore, our
GME estimator is obtained via a (convex) MINLP, we also provide a basic review of the
MINLP problem.
3.1 A Basic Review of GME
The GME estimation is based on the classic maximum entropy (ME) approach of Jaynes
(1957a, 1957b, 1984), which uses the entropy-information measure of Shannon (1948) to re-
cover the unknown probability distribution of underdetermined problems. In the classic ME
approach, Shannons (1948) entropy is used to measure the uncertainty (state of knowledge)
we have about the occurrence of a collection of events. Letting x be a random variable with
possible outcomes xs, s = 1; 2; : : : ; n; with probabilities s such that
P
s s = 1, Shannon
(1948) dened the entropy of the distribution  = (1; :::n)0, as
H   
X
s
s lns (4)
where 0 ln 0  0. The function H, which Shannon interprets as a measure of the uncertainty
in the mind of someone about to receive a message, reaches a maximum when 1 = 2 =
::: = n = 1=n. To recover the unknown probabilities  that characterize a given data set,
Jaynes (1957a, 1957b) proposed maximizing entropy, subject to available sample-moment
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information and adding up constraints on the probabilities.
Obviously, within the classic ME framework, the observed moments are assumed to be
exact. To extend this approach to the problems with noise, the GME approach (developed
by Golan, Judge, and Miller, 1996) generalize the ME approach by using a dual objective
(precision and prediction) function. We illustrate the GME approach via a linear model:
Y = X + " (5)
where Y being a N  1 dependent variable vector, X being a N K matrix of explanatory
variables,  being K  1 a vector of parameters, and " being a N  1 vector of disturbance
terms. The GME rule for dening the estimator of the unknown  in this general linear model
formulation is given by ^ = Zp^ with p^ = (p^01; :::p^
0
K)
0 derived from the following constrained
maximum entropy problem:
max
p0k;w
0
i
 
KX
k=1
p0k ln(pk) 
NX
i=1
!0i ln(!i) (6)
s:t: Y = XZP + V !
10pk = 1; 8k
10!i = 1; 8i
pk > [0]; !i > 0: 8i; k
where Z and V are KKM and NNJ matrices of support points for the  and " vectors,
respectively, as:
Z =
266666664
z01 0 ::: 0
0 z02 ::: 0
: : ::: :
0 0 ::: z0K
377777775
and V =
266666664
v01 0 ::: 0
0 v02 ::: 0
: : ::: :
0 0 : v0N
377777775
(7)
where zk = (zk1; :::zkM)0 is a M  1 vector such that zk1 < zk2  :::  zkM and k 2
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(zk1; zkM),3 and similarly vi = (vi1; :::v1J)0 is a vector such that vi1 < vi2  :::  v1J and
"i 2 (vi1; v1J), typically, vi1 and v1J will be uniformly and symmetrically distributed about
zero and have the same J dimensions. The actual bounds used for a given problem depend on
the observed sample as well as any available conceptual or empirical information4. TheM1
pk vectors and the J1 !i vectors are weight vectors having nonnegative elements that sum
to unity and are used to represent the  and " vectors as  = Zp and " = V !. Golan, Judge
and Miller (1996) has a rigorous discussion of this approach and applies to a rich scopes of
econometric problems, such as dynamic model, model selection and discrete choice-consored
problems. Mittelhammer and Cardell (1997) establish consistency and asymptotic normality
results for the GME estimator under general regularity conditions on the specication of the
estimation problem.
3.2 A Basic Review of MINLP
Since our GME estimator for the sequential move game essentially be obtained via a
generalized disjunctive programming, which can be reformulated to a MINLP problem, we
also provide a basic review of the general structure and feasible algorithms for the MINLP
problem. MINLP provides a powerful framework for mathematically modeling optimiza-
tion problems that involve discrete and continuous variables. Such optimization problems
arise in many real world applications. Integer variables are often required to model logi-
cal relationships, xed charges, piecewise linear functions, disjunctive constraints and the
non-divisibility of resources. Nonlinear functions are required to accurately reect physical
properties, covariance, and economies of scale. Over the last few years there has been a
3This parameter support is based on prior information or economic theory, for example, we might specify
boundaries of zk1 = 0 and zkM = 1 when estimating the marginal propensity to consume, without any
available prior information, we can specify zk to be symmetric around zero, with large negative and positive
boundaries. For example, zk1 =  zkM =  106:
4One viable approach is to use Chebychevs Inequality or the three-sigma rule (Pukelsheim, 1994) and
assume the errors are drawn from a uniform distribution with mean zero and variance (ymax  ymin)=12. (A.
Golan et al. 1997)
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pronounced increase in the development of these models. The most basic form of an MINLP
problem when represented in algebraic form is as follows:
min
fx;yg
Z = f(x; y) (8)
s:t: gj(x; y)  0; j 2 J
x 2 X; y 2 Y
where f(), g() are di¤erentiable functions, J is the index set of inequalities, and x and y are
the continuous and discrete variables, respectively. The discrete set Y in most applications
is restricted to 0  1 values, y 2 f0; 1gm. When f(), g() both are convex functions, it turns
to be a convex MINLP, actually, which can be exactly solved via most of existing algorithms,
for the nonconvex case, only a few methods are available.
Methods that have addressed the solution of convex MINLP include the branch and
bound method (BB) (Gupta and Ravindran, 1985; Nabar and Schrage, 1991; Borchers and
Mitchell, 1994; Stubbs and Mehrotra, 1999; Ley¤er, 2001), Generalized Benders Decompo-
sition (GBD) (Geo¤rion, 1972), Outer-Approximation (OA) (Duran and Grossmann, 1986;
Yuan et al., 1988; Fletcher and Ley¤er, 1994), LP/NLP based branch and bound (Quesada
and Grossmann, 1992), and Extended Cutting Plane Method (ECP) (Westerlund and Pet-
tersson, 1995). Methods for nonconvex MINLP include LP relaxation (Sherali & Adams,
1990), LP and SDP relaxations (Lov asz & Schrijver, 1991), SDP relaxations (Lasserre,
2001) and Branch-and-Reduce (Tawarmalani & Sahinidis, 2002). Such methods are involved
in some optimization software with high-level interfaces such as GAMS, AMPL, and TOM-
LAB which has a MATLAB interface. In GAMS, the state-of-the-art solvers BARON and
BONMIN both can handle the convex MINLP, but only BARON can handle nonconvex
MINLPs in general, it implements a spatial branch-and-bound algorithm that is based on a
factorable reformulation of the given problem and convexications of univariate functions.
We take the technique of solving MINLP as given.
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4 ESTIMATION
Now we propose our GME estimator, in order to make use of the GME estimation, we need
further assumptions about the utility functions. Although there is no exactly identication
problem in GME framework (Golan et al., 1996), we discuss the identication issue from the
nature the game structure and equilibrium conditions, which bring us introduce Assumption
1. And since the entropy is additive only for independent source of uncertainty, we also put
the i.i.d assumption on random shocks for expositional clarity, any known heteroskedasticity
and dependence among random shocks all can be handled within the GME framework.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Scale and Location Normalizations). The payo¤s of one action
for each player are xed at a known constant.
As argued by BHR (2009), this restriction is similar to the argument that we can normal-
ize the mean utility from the outside good equal to a constant, usually zero, in a standard
discrete choice model. One clearly nd that from the equilibrium condition (2) that adding
a constant to all deterministic payo¤s does not perturb the set of equilibria, so a location
normalization is necessary. A scale normalization is also necessary, as multiplying all de-
terministic payo¤s by a positive constant does not alter the SPE. Actually, without such
normalizations, our GME estimator still work, but the level value of each estimated para-
meter does not make any sense, they are only signicative in the ratio term. Thus, the
normalizations which act as a prior information can improve our GME estimation, and also
reduce the number of parameters, we would like to impose these location and scale normal-
izations.
ASSUMPTION 2. (Regularity Conditions of Random Shocks). The random pref-
erence shocks it(a) are distributed i.i.d and independent of state variables with zero mean
and limit variance, i.e. E(it(a)) = 0; E(xit(a)) = 0; V ar(it(a)) <1:
Assumption 2 which we need for establishing the GME estimation is more broad than the
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most other work does, such as Maruyama (2009), the normality of shocks is vital to that es-
timator relies on simulation. Such i.i.d assumption is not strict for our GME estimation, any
known heteroskedasticity and dependence among random shocks all can be handled within
the our GME framework, we will discuss more about it after presenting our estimator. Our
GME estimator is semiparametric in terms of it does not impose any parametric assumption
of the random shocks. For purposes of exposition, we use the simple entry game which has
been introduced in section 2 to introduce the GME estimation, under Assumption 1 and the
specic utility function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)fx+ g(a) + i(a)g (9)
The entry game turns to be which lists in Fig.2.
Fig.2 A Reformulated Entry Game
P1
P2 P2
0 1
0 1 0 1
0 0 x+ g(1; 0) + 1(1; 0) x+ g(1; 1) + 1(1; 1)
0 x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1) 0 x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
Obviously, in terms of the scale and location normalizations, we set the utility of out the
market normalized to 0 and the parameter  to 1. The equilibrium conditions for action
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prole (0; 0) to be SPE outcomes are:
Player1: 0 > x+ g(1; 0) + 1(1; 0) if 0 > x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
0 > x+ g(1; 1) + 1(1; 1) if 0  x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
Player2: 0 > x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)
(10)
Similarly, the equilibrium conditions for (0; 1) to be SPE outcomes are:
Player1: 0 > x+ g(1; 0) + 1(1; 0) if 0 > x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
0 > x+ g(1; 1) + 1(1; 1) if 0  x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
Player2: x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)  0
(11)
for (1; 0) are:
Player1: x+ g(1; 0) + 1(1; 0)  0 if 0 > x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)
x+ g(1; 0) + 1(1; 0)  0 if 0  x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)
Player2: 0 > x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)
(12)
nally, for (1; 1) are:
Player1: x+ g(1; 1) + 1(1; 1)  0 if 0 > x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)
x+ g(1; 1) + 1(1; 1)  0 if 0  x+ g(0; 1) + 2(0; 1)
Player2: x+ g(1; 1) + 2(1; 1)  0
(13)
In order to use the GME framework, we need to specify the support space for  and (a),
which we dene as z, v1, v2, v3, v4 for , 1t(1; 0), 1t(1; 1), 2t(0; 1) and 2t(1; 1) respectively,
without loss of generality, each of them are M  1 vector and v1 = v2 = v3 = v4 = v; the
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corresponding probabilities are dened as p; !1t ; !
2
t ; !
3
t ; !
4
t such that:
 =
MX
m=1
pmzm (14)
1t(1; 0) =
MX
m=1
!1tmv (15)
1t(1; 1) =
MX
m=1
!2tmv (16)
2t(0; 1) =
MX
m=1
!3tmv (17)
2t(1; 1) =
MX
m=1
!4tmv (18)
Our GME estimator is obtained from the estimated probabilities which are the solution of
problem:
max
fpm;!1tm;!2tm;!3tm;!4tmg
H =  
MX
m=1
pm ln(p

m) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!1tm ln(!
1
tm)  (19)
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!2tm ln(!
2
tm) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!3tm ln(!
3
tm) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!4tm ln(!
4
tm)
subject to the corresponding constraints which list in equation (10) to (13) with the repara-
meterized  and :
If 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 0) +
PM
m=1 !
1
tmvm if 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm
aot = 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
2
tmvm if 0 
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm
(0; 0) 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(0; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
3
tmvm
(20)
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If 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 0) +
PM
m=1 !
1
tmvm if 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm
aot = 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
2
tmvm if 0 
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm
(0; 1)
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(0; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
3
tmvm  0
(21)
If aot =
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 0) +
PM
m=1 !
1
tmvm  0
(1; 0) 0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm
(22)
If aot =
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
2
tmvm  0
(1; 1)
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm  0
(23)
and the normalization-additvity constraints:
PM
m=1 p

m = 1PM
m=1 !
1
tm = 1;8t 2 TPM
m=1 !
2
tm = 1;8t 2 TPM
m=1 !
3
tm = 1;8t 2 TPM
m=1 !
4
tm = 1;8t 2 T
p; !1t ; !
2
t ; !
3
t ; !
4
t > 0;8t 2 T
(24)
Note that for each market or each repetition of the game, there is unique equilibria, then the
constraints for each market are one of the four possible constraints which list in equation
(20) to (23). With the estimated p^m, our GME estimator of the structure parameter  will
be:
^GME =
MX
m=1
p^mzm (25)
For this simple game, except for constraints (22) and (23), the constraints all contain the
logical statements such as if::: then::: between endogenous variables, this programming is
called disjunctive programming which can be reformulated as MINLP, for example, consider
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the logical statements:
y1 < 0 if x < 0
y2 < 0 if x  0
(26)
we can reformulate them to the statements with inter variables which can be easily handled
in the MINLP problem by introducing a zero or one variable q, the statement (26) will be:
x M(1  q) < 0
x+Mq  0
y1 < M(1  q)
y2 < Mq
q = f0; 1g
(27)
where M is a big positive variable which exceeds the bound of x such as 9:e10. Such refor-
mulations are discussed severely in H.P. Williams (1985) and Raman and Grossmann (1991).
By introducing such a zero or one variable, our GME programming can be reformulated as
the following MINLP problem:
max
fpm;!1tm;!2tm;!3tm;!4tm;qtg
H =  
MX
m=1
pm ln(p

m) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!1tm ln(!
1
tm)  (28)
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!2tm ln(!
2
tm) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!3tm ln(!
3
tm) 
TX
t=1
MX
m=1
!4tm ln(!
4
tm)
s:t:
if aot = (0; 0)
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm   MqtPM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm < M(1  qt)PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 0) +
PM
m=1 !
1
tmvm < M(1  qt)PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
2
tmvm < Mqt
0 >
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(0; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
3
tmvm
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if aot = (0; 1)
PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm   MqtPM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
4
tmvm < M(1  qt)PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 0) +
PM
m=1 !
1
tmvm < M(1  qt)PM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(1; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
2
tmvm < MqtPM
m=1 p

mzmxt + g(0; 1) +
PM
m=1 !
3
tmvm  0
and equation (22), (23)
normalization-additvity constraints equation (24)
qt 2 (0; 1)
Optimization (28) which can be solved via MINLP techniques yields the estimated probabil-
ity for each unkonwns, which include the probabilities for our structural parameter , thus
the estimated ^ can be recovered from the original reparameterization:
^GME =
MX
m=1
p^mzm (29)
Note that if the payo¤function is linear in all covariates, x, then the optimization problem
becomes a convex MINLP, since the objective entropy function is always a concave function.
For the game which has more than two players, more than two actions, and more than two
stages, the estimation (28) can be straightforwardly extended to involve more constraints,
also more zero or one variables to hold more logical statements. One also can simplify the
reformulation of logical conditions by investigating the recursive structure of the sequential
move games.
The GME estimator proposed above essentially is a MPEC style estimator, as argued by
Su and Judd (2008), implementing asymptotic inference methods is more complex with the
MPEC approach. Computing standard errors requires the computation of the Hessian of the
objective function with respect to structural parameters , such work seems hard within the
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MINLP framework since our GME estimation problem is a non-smooth optimization. Al-
though Su and Judd (2008) suggest use the bootstrap methods to construct standard errors
which can avoid the nite sample bias that may raise with standard asymptotic methods,
the asymptotic renements may not be obtained in our GME estimation. Following the
arguments of Horowitz (1995, 1998, 2001), little is known about the ability of the bootstrap
to provide asymptotic renements for hypothesis tests and condence intervals based on
such non-smooth estimators, but for widely range of non-smooth estimators, such as the
least-absolute-deviations (LAD) estimator, bootstrap can provide a consistent approxima-
tion to the asymptotic distribution (De Angelis, et al., 1993; Hahn, 1995). In this sense,
we also suggest use the bootstrap to get the standard errors for structural parameters and
related inferences, and since our model make no parametric assumptions on random shocks,
a nonparametric (paired) bootstrap will be the choice. Horowitz (1995, 1998, 2001) also
explains how some non-smooth estimators can be smoothed in a way that greatly simpli-
es the analysis of the their asymptotic distributional properties, the bootstrap provides
asymptotic renements for hypothesis tests and condence intervals based on the smoothed
estimators. Smoothing our GME estimator is also possible since for most cases we can
reformulate MINLP problem to nonlinear programming (NLP) with complementarity con-
straints (MPCC), Chen and Mangasarian (1996) provides a class of smoothing functions for
nonlinear and mixed complementarity problems. Furthermore, recently there are some new
resampling methods provided in order to deal with such nonregular estimation problems and
estimators, Zeng and Lin (2008) based on asymptotic expansion via empirical process ar-
guments suggests some e¢ cient resampling procedures for non-smooth estimators, Andrews
and Guggenberger (2009) also provides some e¢ cient Hybrid and Size-Corrected subsam-
pling methods. We will investigate these alternative methods within our GME estimation
framework in another paper.
As noted above, our framework can deal with a wide range of random shocksstructures
which depart the i.i.d assumption, such as the market specic shocks which considered by
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Maruyama (2009). Consider the simple entry game in Fig.2, when introducing a market
specic information not observed by econometrician, i, and the total random preference
shocks of player i in the market t specied as:
it(a) = !it(a) + i (30)
where !it(a) and i are both independently distributed across players (entrants) and markets,
with this specic variance structure, we can deeply treat with variables !it(a) and i instead
of it(a), which also means a additive entropy objective function.
5 MONTE CARLO
To demonstrate the performance of our estimator in small samples, we conducted two Monte
Carlo experiments using the simple sequential entry game which introduce in section 2 and
3. There are two players and each player has the following prot function:
ui(x; a; i; ) = 1(ai = 1)f1x1 + 2xi2   3xi3 + i(a)g (31)
In the rst experiment, we dene x1  N(10; 1), xi2  N(1; 1); and xi3 = 9(N(a) 1), where
N(a) is the number of entrants for a action prole a, and it(a), the idiosyncratic error term,
are drawn from standard normal distribution. In the second experiment, we dene two of
the it(a) drawn from uniform distribution [ 1; 1], others are same as experiment one.
As discussed previously, our model requires both scale and location normalizations, so
we assume that 3 = 1 and the payo¤s of not entering are zero. Thus our game has two
unknown parameters: 1 and 2. The game generates equilibrium conditions for each of the
possible equilibrium action proles which will be the constraints of our GME estimation.
We generated 10000 samples of size t = 25; 50; 100; and 200 to assess the nite sample
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properties of our estimator. The true parameter vector was chosen as 1 = 1 and 2 =  1.
The parameter estimates are presented in Table I and II, the empirical distributions of
parameter estimates are reported in Fig.3 and Fig.4.
Table I: Monte Carlo Results for Normal Shocks
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
1 1:1651 1:1350 0:1387 0:1651 0:1350 0:0465
2  2:5561  2:3814 0:8934  1:5561  1:3814 3:2194
T = 50
1 1:0471 1:0388 0:0555 0:0471 0:0388 0:0052
2  1:5566  1:4607 0:4868  0:5566  0:4607 0:5466
T = 100
1 0:9934 0:9924 0:0247  0:0066  0:0076 0:0006
2  1:0449  1:0265 0:2215  0:0449  0:0265 0:0511
T = 200
1 0:9944 0:9941 0:0142  0:0056  0:0059 0:0002
2  1:0403  1:0344 0:1171  0:0403  0:0344 0:0153
True value: 1 = 1, 2 =  1; Monte Carlo Times: 10000
23
Table II: Monte Carlo Results for Normal and Uniform Shocks
Standard Mean Median
Parameter Mean Median Deviation Bias Bias MSE
T = 25
1 1:1660 1:1378 0:1410 0:1660 0:1378 0:0474
2  2:5643  2:4009 0:8977  1:5643  1:4009 3:2528
T = 50
1 1:0461 1:0371 0:0548 0:0461 0:0371 0:0051
2  1:5472  1:4479 0:4841  0:5472  0:4479 0:5338
T = 100
1 0:9937 0:9931 0:0253  0:0063  0:0069 0:0007
2  1:0460  1:0283 0:2238  0:0460  0:0283 0:0521
T = 200
1 0:9946 0:9941 0:0141 0:005 4 0:0059 0:0002
2  1:0435  1:0383 0:1149 0:0435 0:0383 0:0151
True value: 1 = 1, 2 =  1; Monte Carlo Times: 10000
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Fig.3 Distribution of Estimators with Normal Shocks.
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Fig.4 Distribution of Estimators with Normal and Uniform Shocks
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The results are encouraging even in the smaller samples sizes, the payo¤ parameters are
estimated near their true values, and as the sample size increase, the estimates become more
precisely. One may nd that parameter 2 is estimated with much less precision, this mostly
due to 1 has a larger inuence over the equilibrium than a change in 2, since 1 multiplies a
covariate with a higher mean than 2, even though they have the same average. In a extreme
small sample, the change in 2 may not change the equilibrium actions, since you can see,
with the sample size becomes larger, even 2 is estimated precisely.
The little di¤erence between the two simulation outcomes shows that our GME estimator
can handle not only the normal distribution. The empirical distributions of parameter esti-
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mates which list in Fig.3 and Fig.4 show that our GME estimator is asymptotically normal
distributed.
6 APPLICATION
*********************TBW***********************
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a data-constrained GME estimator for the discrete sequential
move game of perfect information, which can be obtained via a MINLP. By directly using the
data-constraints which implied by the equilibrium conditions, we avoid the multidimensional
integrals which always make such estimation intractable. Moreover, our GME estimator also
does not need the parametric assumption (mostly, normality) of the random shocks, this as-
sumption is prerequisite for the existing estimators for general complete information games.
We formulate the GME estimation as a (convex) mixed-integer nonlinear optimization prob-
lem (MINLP) which is well developed over the last few years. The estimation can be easily
implemented on optimization software with high-level interfaces such as GAMS, AMPL.
The model is identied with only weak scale and location normalizations, monte carlo evi-
dence demonstrates that the estimator can perform well in moderately size samples. As an
application, we study the social security acceptance decisions in dual career households.
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